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The Many Riches of Human Flourishing: On the Veiled Agent in Veil Narratives1 
Muneer Aram Kuzhiyan 
 
Introduction 
I begin with the popular tale ‘The Elephant in a Dark Room’ from the thirteenth-century 
Persian poet Rumi’s Masnavi. An elephant was being exhibited in a dark room, and many 
people thronged to see it. But it was pitch dark and, unable to see the elephant, they all had to 
feel it with their hands to get a sense of what it was like. One who felt its trunk declared that 
the beast was much like a water pipe; another who felt its ear said it must be a large fan; 
another felt its leg, and thought it resembled a pillar; another, after feeling its back, concluded 
the beast was nothing but a great throne. Depending on the part which each felt, they painted 
a different picture of the animal.2 For all its varied versions, the story continues to illustrate 
the dangers of partial or distorted vision and is no less relevant when it comes to engaging the 
agency of the female Muslim subject. This story, to my mind, has strong resonances for 
Malayalam writer Khadija Mumthas’ novel Barsa, which literally means ‘one who reveals 
her face.’3 The blurb of the novel claims that in unveiling her face the protagonist Sabitha has 
in effect ‘opened up’ her very heart. The suggestion is that the narrative becomes a journey of 
learning through Islam with a free and ‘open’ mind. I want to trouble the value of this trope 
as a marker of enlightenment – a trope that often defines itself against the ‘closure’ of 
tradition, religious or otherwise. It seems to me that both the novelist and her mouthpiece are 
insensitive, if not blind, to the nuances of women’s agency, which the simplistic registers of 
submission and patriarchy fail to call up – the dual registers within which the charged 
sartorial symbol of the veil is more often than not rendered legible. It should not be mere 
coincidence that the depth of insensitivity and misrepresentation is writ large on the front 
cover of the novel with the enigmatic image of a face half-hidden and only one seeing eye. 
Feminist scholarship has often located women’s agency in the political and moral 
autonomy of the subject. On this view, agency is reduced to the subject resisting or 
subverting relations of domination. What it all boils down to is that one is either being 
subordinated by or resisting norms. If a subordinated subject thinks that she is not dominated 
by anything at all, that is because of her false consciousness that masks the domination/ 
                                                
1 I tried out an earlier, short version of this essay at the three-day international conference titled 
‘Unveiling a Secret Agreement: Revisiting the Contours of English Studies’ organised by the 
Department of English Literature at the English and Foreign Languages University (EFLU), 
Hyderabad, India in November 2012. I am grateful to the audience of the seminar for their questions 
and thoughts. I also thank the two anonymous reviewers of Transnational Literature for their critical 
comments. Their close reading has offered me valuable suggestions on how to consolidate the 
arguments made in the essay, all of which I could not incorporate here, however. The phrase ‘human 
flourishing’ is from the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue: A Study in Moral 
Theory (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1981) 152. I use the term ‘veil narrative’ to designate 
any work of fiction in which un/veiling in any of its myriad forms and manifestations figures 
prominently as a thematic concern. Veil here indicates any of its diverse forms, including the 
headscarf covering the head and extending over the torso, and the face-veil covering the head, face 
and torso.  
2 Jalaluddin Rumi, Masnavi, trans. E. H. Whinfield (Forgotten Books, 2008) 107-111. 
3 Khadija Mumthas, Barsa (Kottayam: D. C. Books, 2007). 
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oppression for her, not because she is in fact under no subjugation. In an exercise of 
transference, Muslim women are usually presented as the stock victims of an oppressive 
patriarchal religion. In recent times, scholars have, however, called into question the 
assumptions undergirding this notion of agency and posited alternative ways of 
conceptualising it, not least in terms of embodiment and subject formation.4 This revisionist 
scholarship helps bring multiple modalities of agency other than resistance to bear upon the 
study of women in diverse religious traditions. Saba Mahmood’s seminal work Politics of 
Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (2005) is key to this scholarly enterprise. 
In her fascinating ethnography of women’s mosque movement in Egypt, Mahmood 
challenges the regnant tendency within poststructuralist feminist theory to posit a liberatory 
conception of agency on ‘the binary model of subordination and subversion.’5 This view, she 
argues, is restrictive in that it overlooks ‘dimensions of human action whose ethical and 
political status does not map on to the logic of repression and resistance.’6 Thus, for 
Mahmood, it is imperative to dislodge the idea of agency from the interests of the 
‘progressive political project.’ In this line of thinking, the modern notion of freedom and 
liberty as the political ideal does not exhaust the aspirations of humanity at large and there 
are specific cultural and historical conditions that engender specific human desires, including 
the desire to be free from, or subvert, norms. Then the right question to ask is about the ways 
of understanding operations of power that produce various types of bodies, knowledge, and 
subjectivities whose trajectories do not lend themselves to the model of progressive politics. 
It follows that the meaning and sense of agency, then, cannot be essentialised in one way or 
the other but it is important to engage the underlying principles that construct specific points 
of view. From this perspective, what might sound like a passive and docile case to 
progressive ears, for example veiling, may actually be a mode of agency if analysed within 
the discourses and structures of subordination that make possible the conditions of its 
                                                
4 Both Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood, who is greatly influenced by the former’s work, have 
persuasively argued that religious practices are central to the constitution of a moral self and produce 
changes in moral subjectivity that cannot be reduced to some other phenomenon. Unlike Kantian and 
liberal political theories of personhood which assume an autonomous and transcendent moral self, 
Asad and Mahmood argue that the moral self does not have any a priori existence, but is the product 
of a series of cultural practices and procedures. See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline 
and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) 
and Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2003); and Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2005). See also ‘Preface to the 2012 Edition’ of Politics 
of Piety where Mahmood reflects on the critical reception of her work and consequently puts in better 
perspective the conceptual architecture of her fascinating ethnography. Charles Hirschkind likewise 
throws light on the role of creative and critical listening in the formation of Muslim spirituality in 
contemporary Egypt. Devout Muslims develop a pious ear through practices as diverse as listening to 
sermons on cassette and learning proper Muslim speech genres. See Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical 
Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006). 
 
5 Mahmood, Politics of Piety 14.  
6 Mahmood, Politics of Piety 14.  
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enactment. So, as Mahmood quite succinctly puts it: ‘agentival capacity is entailed not only 
in those acts that resist norms but also in the multiple ways in which one inhabits norms.’7  
Taking these insights as a point of departure, in what follows I wish to subject to 
critical scrutiny what I call the monologue of ‘unveiled’ resistance that animates the narrative 
of Malayalam writer Khadija Mumthas’ novel Barsa published in 2007. Here I play on the 
word ‘veil’: veil both as a piece of clothing and as an act of hiding, as in the phrase ‘a veiled 
attack.’ The point is to show how the novel betrays a reductive view of veiling as passive and 
submissive through the subtext of a jarring monologue of agency conceptualised in liberatory 
and revolutionary terms.  
 
‘The One Who Reveals Her Face’: The Sartorial Trope of Unveiling the Face and the 
Monologue of Agency in Barsa 
Barsa, set in the Islamic heartland of Saudi Arabia, tells the story of a journey that starts at 
one airport and ends at another. While pursuing her medicine program, the protagonist 
Sabitha, a Hindu, falls in love with her local Muslim friend Rasheed. She finally decides to 
embrace Islam to take his hand in marriage. The couple then work in Saudi Arabia. The 
protagonist Sabitha is invested with the airs of a rebel Muslim right from the very first. She 
has her task cut out for her: to question a patriarchal/male chauvinistic Islam – a job she does 
almost perfectly, thereby leaving no doubt about her agency from a liberal-progressive 
standpoint. The novel, hailed as the first of its kind in the pantheon of Malayalam literature, 
earned its author a place among the long array of Islamic feminists such as Fatima Mernissi, 
Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas and Leila Ahmad, or so we are told by its champions.8 As for 
the liberal activists in Kerala who are too worried about the Muslim women’s plight within 
Islam, the novel provided the right subject, albeit belatedly. The Foreword to the novel 
adequately reflects the monotony of the rave reviews that it has attracted: an attempt to reread 
a male-centered Islam from a women’s perspective; a Muslim feminist novel, a novel that 
presents a free, ‘open’ understanding of Islam through a literally face-revealing protagonist, 
who in doing so, opens up her very heart; a protagonist who seeks to break the limits set by a 
patriarchal Islam, and so on.9 Given the normative progressivist proclivities that have given 
shape to the novel’s narrative, it is important to pause over why the novel was well received 
by a certain section of Kerala society, and this exercise, I think, will help expose the 
uncritical intellectual discourse that shapes public opinion in contemporary Kerala. But this, 
and the disturbing questions about the artistic merit of the novel, are topics that are larger 
than I have the space to address within the scope of this essay.  
I will now turn to an instance in the novel where the author has her mouthpiece 
Sabitha espouse her revolutionary notion of agency that has a patronising ring to it. As the 
                                                
7 Mahmood, Politics of Piety 15.  
8 Cf. Fatima Mernissi, Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry, trans. 
Mary Jo Lakeland (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Woman: 
Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999) and Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford: Oneword, 2006); 
Asma Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the 
Qur’an (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002); and Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in 
Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).  
9 A. P. Kunhamu, ‘Foreword’ in Khadija Mumthas, Barsa (Kottayam: D. C. Books, 2007) 11-16.  
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couple is just settling down in their new flat, there is a conversation staged mainly involving 
Sabitha, and their friends Dr. Muhammad and Abdu. The friends urge Sabitha to share with 
them her new experiences in Saudi Arabia, thereupon she replies: ‘Yes, I have got to tell 
quite a few experiences, as a recent convert and then… as a woman’(47). Then she fires her 
first salvo: ‘(I) have lots of doubts, confusions about several things…but if I disclose them, 
maybe it will amount to blasphemy? Do Muslims have the nerve to take criticisms?’ (47). 
After a while when Dr Muhammad explains that Islam actually enabled social change by 
uniting the warring Arab tribes under the roof of Islam, she quips: ‘O, because those 
draconian diktats that were necessary to tame the minds of the then Bedouin Arabs are still 
constantly imported to our times, Muslims are labeled obscurantists, and are humiliated?’ 
(49). She cites purdah and face-veil as contemporary examples of the so-called backward-
looking norms of an early, ‘primitive’ Islam. She is shocked to see women accepting such 
norms without demur even today. The dissident in Sabitha continues to vent her ire on ‘this 
out-of-step-with–the-time Islam’ that she is confronted with in Saudi Arabia, but this is 
enough to press home the black and white conception of agency that has created the 
protagonist of Sabitha – one that is predicated on the notion that acts of resistance to relations 
of domination exhaust the field of human action. That is, the model of agency that colours the 
construction of Sabitha’s character takes resistance to norms as the only source of agentival 
capacity. But as Mahmood has shown in great ethnographic detail, resistance far from drains 
the well of human action. For a devout Muslim who strives to submit herself to God through 
constant inhabitation of norms, agency resides not so much in resisting norms as in living 
them. Of course, inhabiting norms also involves acts of resistance: resisting one’s self-
interests or temptations in submitting oneself to the will of God – to cite but one example. 
But this resistance is not geared to achieving the realisation of a free, autonomous, self-
owning individuality so central to the constitution of the liberal subject. Incidentally, 
Sabitha’s ‘red strands of hair that have escaped her headscarf’– a phrase in the novel’s 
concluding paragraph – may be an ironic statement on her own ‘self’ that seeks to ‘escape’ 
norms. 
 
‘Docile’ Agents and ‘Willing Obedience’: Some Reflections on Silences and Erasures in 
Barsa’s Narrative 
Following Mahmood, I argue that Mumthas’ reductive view of Muslim women’s agency 
stems from her failure to delink the idea of agency from the aims of progressive politics that 
have sought to restrict the notion of agency within the trope of resistance against oppressive 
and dominating operations of power. This is not to deny the existence of this particular 
modality of agency, but to emphasise the point that ‘the meaning of agency must be explored 
within the grammar of concepts within which it resides.’10 I suggest that what might appear 
to be a case of passive adherence to some backward-looking norms in Sabitha’s eyes is 
indeed a modality of agency if explained within a notion of agency that is not tied to the 
binary model of domination/submission. The unveiling of a Muslim woman in the spirit of 
liberatory endeavor constitutes one modality of action but the religiously-inspired program of 
moral formation, including adopting the veil, practiced by many Muslim women in Kerala, as 
elsewhere, and often decried for their patriarchal proclivities, is also a speech act that forms 
agency, no less. I find particularly useful here the idea of docility that Mahmood develops out 
                                                
10 Mahmood, Politics of Piety 34.  
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of Michel Foucault11: rather than being a synonym for passivity, ‘docility’ in this line of 
thought takes on a meaning of ‘teachability’ that demands will, effort and perseverance.12 
This understanding brings to sharp relief the Foucauldian insight that specific relations of 
subordination enable and enact modes of human agency.  
To illuminate the interesting paradox of ‘docile agent,’ Mahmood offers the now 
famous example of an accomplished pianist who ‘submits herself to the often painful regime 
of the disciplinary practice, as well as to the hierarchical structures of apprenticeship, in order 
to acquire the ability – the requisite agency – to play the instrument with mastery.’13 Notably, 
the agency of the virtuoso pianist rests on her ability to be taught, to undergo the required 
rigorous training, which is a classic docile condition. Although ‘docility’ is often understood 
to be a synonym for the ‘abandonment of agency,’ Mahmood wants to mark the fact that 
docility ‘literally implies the malleability required of someone in order for her to be 
instructed in a particular skill or knowledge – a meaning that carries less a sense of passivity 
than one of struggle, effort, exertion, and achievement.’14 Talal Asad also stresses the 
importance of the etymology of ‘docile’ as he says: ‘… I’m interested in “the docile subject” 
as someone who is teachable and therefore as someone who has the capacity to be taught.’15 
More importantly, in examining ‘disciplinary practices’ such as the various ways in 
which ‘religious discourses’ control, influence, and produce ‘religious selves,’ Talal Asad 
points up the centrality of the virtue of ‘willing obedience’ in medieval Christian monastic 
practice.16 Building on the Foucauldian analytics of power, Asad wants to think of power not 
merely as a repressive, external force but as an enabling, internal relationship – as 
potentiality, the ability to do something, to enact something in relation to other persons, 
things, institutions, and so on. Thus, the question that Asad seeks to forefront concerns not so 
much what meanings might be attributed to human acts as how one is able to do certain 
things.17 This way of thinking about power helps Asad to remain sensitive to the conditions 
within which obedient wills are created. As he puts it, in medieval Christian monastery, the 
will to obey was a Christian virtue cultivated through discipline:  
 
The Christian monk who learns to will obedience is not merely someone who submits 
to another’s will by force of argument or the threat of force – or simply by way of 
habitual, unthinking response. He is not someone who has ‘lost his own will,’ as 
though a man’s will could be truly his only when it remained opposed to another’s. 
The obedient monk is a person for whom obedience is his virtue – in the sense of 
being his ability, potentiality, power.18 
                                                
11 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, Vol. 2 of The History of Sexuality. trans. R. Hurley (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1990).  
12 Mahmood, Politics of Piety 29.  
13 Mahmood, Politics of Piety 29. 
14 Mahmood, Politics of Piety 29. 
15 David Scott, ‘The Trouble of Thinking: An Interview with Talal Asad’ in Powers of the Secular 
Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors, eds. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006) 287.  
16 Asad, Genealogies of Religion 125.  
17 Scott, ‘Interview with Talal Asad’ 271-72. 
18 Asad, Genealogies of Religion 125; See also Asad’s discussion of agency and pain in Asad, 
Formations of the Secular 67-99.  
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Thus, in highlighting the formation of ‘willing obedience’ to authority within the framework 
of the monastic life, Asad provides us with insights into how we may understand agency and 
subject-formation enabled by disciplinary practices in which one does live and inhabit norms 
rather than subvert them. Significantly, in this life world it is the very structure of authority or 
regime, rather than the freedom from it,that provides the conditions of agency. This notion, 
needless to say, sits uncomfortably with the normative conception of the liberal subject as a 
free and autonomous individual who makes or breaks his/her choices in life.  
Also germane to apprehending the embodied character of tradition is the concept of 
habitus – a concept which, though first introduced into the social sciences by Marcel Mauss19 
and popularised by Pierre Bourdieu,20 can be traced way back to Aristotle’s moral thinking 
and has influenced both Christian and Islamic traditions. Habitus is about ethical formation 
made possible by a certain pedagogical process through which a moral disposition is 
acquired. This process entails the acquisition of a virtue by a person through consistent 
physical exertion, assiduous practice, and discipline such that this virtue becomes 
permanently enmeshed in the person’s character. Drawing on Mauss’s formulation of habitus 
in his essay ‘Body Techniques,’ Asad employs habitus to refer to the ‘predisposition of the 
body,’ to its ‘traditional sensibilities’–to ‘that aspect of a tradition in which specific virtues 
are defined and an attempt is made to cultivate and enact them.’21 One can see an echo of this 
principle in the fourteenth century Muslim thinker Ibn Khaldun’s (d. 1406) notion of 
‘malaka’. As Khaldun puts it, ‘A (malak) is a firmly rooted quality acquired by doing a 
certain action and repeating it time after time, until the form of (that action) is firmly fixed. A 
(malaka) corresponds to the original (action after which it was formed).’22 The notion of 
habitus, therefore, brings to relief the constitutive role of conscious, repeated performance of 
actions – virtuous or otherwise – in forging and augmenting subjectivities.23 This essay has 
sought to resignify the religious importance of habitus as a form of agency and consequently 
veiling as one of the legitimate means of self-realisation for devout Muslim women, rather 
than as the quintessential instantiation of patriarchal oppression and objectification of Muslim 
                                                
19 Marcel Mauss, ‘Body Techniques’ in Sociology and Psychology: Essays, Marcel Mauss, trans. Ben 
Brewster (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).  
20 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).  
21 Scott, ‘Interview with Talal Asad’ 289. Also see Asad, Genealogies of Religion 75-76, and Asad, 
Formations of the Secular 251-52.  
22 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1958) 346. The Khaldunian idea of malaka/habitus has been well explored by the 
historian Ira Lapidus in his essay ‘Knowledge, Virtue and Action: The Classical Muslim Conception 
of Adab and the Nature of Religious Fulfillment in Islam’ in Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place 
of Adab in South Asian Islam, ed. Barbara Metcalf (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) 
38-61. 
23 In order to put in perspective the Egyptian mosque movement’s conception of salat (ritual prayer), 
Saba Mahmood also draws on the Aristotelian formulation of habitus, which is taken to mean ‘an 
acquired excellence at either a moral or a practical craft, learned through repeated practice until that 
practice leaves a permanent mark on the character of the person.’ Mahmood, Politics of Piety 136. For 
Mahmood’s critique of Bourdieu’s notion of habitus for its inherent socioeconomic determinism and 
inattention to the pedagogical process entailed in habitus-formation, see Mahmood, Politics of Piety 
138-139.  
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women, as Barsa would have us believe. In so doing, it largely foregrounds the fact that 
agency exists and flourishes in ways that are hard to recognise through a secular liberal lens 
that is invariably brought to discuss and ‘reform’ the plight of woman in Islam – a lens that 
no less imprisons Barsa’s narrative.  
I have invoked here the critical scholarship on embodiment and subject-formation in 
order to draw attention to the diverse modalities of agency that are often obscured, if not 
obliterated, by the dominant model of agency as resistance to relations of power and 
authority. Mumthas’ monologue of agency in Barsa demonstrates no understanding that 
divergent conceptual understandings of a practice create divergent subjectivities as well as 
social and political life worlds, and that it would be a mistake to privilege one over the other. 
The novel, I argue, betrays the author’s dis-ease with the modalities of agency other than 
subverting norms and belies the burden of proving Islam’s compatibility with the ideals of 
liberalism – a burden she shares with many contemporary Muslim reformers who fit the bill 
‘liberal Islam.’24 Moreover, the rhetorical claim of the novel to be an open assessment of 
Islam by a ‘face-revealing’ Sabitha – note that Sabitha’s capacity to undertake a journey 
through Islam with an open heart is contingent upon her unveiling her face – allows to go 
unchallenged the putatively secular foundations and premises of critique. Thus it becomes 
very easy to take the argument to its logical conclusion: a veiled Muslim woman, by virtue of 
her veiling and not displaying her face, forecloses thought and debate and is rendered 
incapable of carrying out the kind of critical task that the unveiled Sabitha is involved in.  
This argument, again, stems from an uncritical acceptance of the supposed clash 
between what Mahmood calls ‘the secular necessity and religious threat.’25 According to this 
dichotomous characterisation, some kind of ‘religious extremism’ or ‘fanaticism’ often 
associated with a host of images and practices such as suicide bombers and veiled women is 
said to threaten secular liberal ways of life and conduct. On this understanding, religion is 
understood to be closed, ossified, uncritical, and stagnant in stark contrast to a secular liberal 
worldview, which is showcased as open, reflective, critical, and dynamic. Consequently, 
critique is celebrated as the hallmark of the latter. Mahmood unsettles this presumed 
secularity of critique and debate that is taken for granted in any academic and popular 
discussion of religion today. She argues that the conjoining of critique and secular culture and 
thought is predicated on the assumption that unlike religious belief, critique requires 
acquiring a necessary distance between the subject and the object and some form of reasoned 
deliberation. This view often makes itself intelligible against religious reading practices 
where the subject is taken to be ‘so mired in the object that she cannot achieve the distance 
                                                
24 The term ‘liberal Muslim reformers’ is used as shorthand to refer to those who believe that the 
proper domain of religious practice is a putative private sphere marked by personal devotion. These 
reformers in Kerala are mostly left-leaning progressivist writers, including A. P. Kunhamu, who has 
written the Foreword to Barsa. This resonates with the case of Muslim reformers at an international 
level who come from a wide spectrum of political perspectives: some support the reformist trend 
within the Islamist movement such as the Egyptian Tariq al-Bishri, the Tunisian Scholar Rashid al-
Ghannouchi and the Iranian Abdolkarim Soroush; and some are inclined to a more straightforward 
secular-liberal line such as the Egyptian Said Ashmawi and Aziza al-Hibri in the US. See Saba 
Mahmood, ‘Questioning Liberalism, Too,’ Boston Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2003) 18-19. 
25 Saba Mahmood, ‘Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?’in Is 
Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, eds. Talal Asad et al (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2009) 65. 
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necessary for the practice of critique.’26 As Mahmood points out, what is elided in this 
normative conception of critique is an acknowledgement of the ‘disciplines of subjectivity, 
affective attachments, and subject-object relationality’ that underwrite this particular, 
dominant paradigm of critique.27 Put another way, there is nothing essentially ‘neutral’ about 
the secular liberal principles of freedom of religion and speech aimed at negotiating religious 
difference and these principles have their own ideological moorings tethered to certain 
normative conceptions of religion, subject, language, and offence.  
My point in reviewing this contemporary discourse on the taken-for-granted 
‘secularity of critique’ here is to suggest that Barsa’s mobilisation of the trope of open 
critique of Islam – as exemplified in the ‘face-revealing’ character of Sabitha and in sharp 
contrast to the ‘docile’ Muslim women she confronts in Saudi Arabia – enfolds a normative 
conception of critique such that this characterisation becomes an instantiation of the supposed 
secularity of critique vis-à-vis the closure of an orthodox Islam. Thus, despite its 
complacency about the labor of open critique it has arrogated to itself, readers of Barsa will, 
however, recognise the woefully closed and lopsided view of Islam, and particularly of 
Muslim women, that the novel propagates. To say this, again, is not so much to pass 
judgment on which view is true or false as to draw attention to the fact that Barsa’s narrative 
is not an empty, homogeneous phenomenon, but is in fact complicit with a larger secular 
liberal worldview with its own naturalised, normative assumptions about what is religion and 
proper religious subjectivity and conduct in the modern world. 28 
A critique of Barsa in terms outlined above might be taken to task for its apparent 
religious obstinacy in dealing with a literary work which, in secular parlance, is presumed to 
be a world unto itself – a self-sufficient, free-floating entity unmediated by any politics and 
ideological moorings. The assumption is that such critiques taking literature at its face value 
issue from a lack of literary sensibilities on the part of those who mount them. However, I do 
not need to belabor the point that literature, fiction in particular, far from being an innocent 
practice, carries its own ideological baggage. It mobilises a particular set of images, figures, 
events, arguments, and narratives in order to construct and give expression to its cherished 
ideals and presuppositions. The various repertoires galvanised in a literary work such as its 
special images, figures, and events evoke disparate forms of recognition among its audiences 
who have diverse, at times mutually incommensurable, sensibilities – secular and religious, 
for example. It is, therefore, natural that depending on one’s personal stake and investment in 
the problem in question, a literary work engenders a variety of responses from its audiences. 
For instance, some celebrate it for what it is while some others resent it or even condemn it 
for the very same reason. Literature speaks to its diverse audiences with the intention of 
                                                
26 Mahmood, ‘Religious Reason and Secular Affect’ 90.  
27 Mahmood, ‘Religious Reason and Secular Affect’ 90. Mahmood here draws on Michael Warner’s 
thought-provoking essay ‘Uncritical Reading,’ in Polemic: Critical or Uncritical, ed. Jane Gallop 
(New York: Routledge, 2004) 13-38. Warner in this essay situates the emergence of the dominant 
paradigm of secular critique against the backdrop of certain historical transformations in practices of 
reading, exegesis, and so on.  
28 For an insightful bunch of articles that call into question the seemingly secular bases of critique in 
the wake of the controversial Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, see Talal Asad et al, eds., Is 
Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2009). Also relevant is Saba Mahmood, ‘Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of 
Islamic Reformation,’ Public Culture, Vol. 18, no. 2 (2006) 323–47.  
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provoking recognition among them and this recognition manifests itself in a wide range of 
responses that ensue. Thus, if Barsa could be legitimately hailed for its liberatory program of 
idealising the secular liberal, progressive ideal of agency, it seems to me equally legitimate to 
decry the work for its insensitivity, if not blindness, to other ways of constructing and 
enacting agency in the world. For, like the enthusiasts of Barsa, its critics are also very much 
part of the world that literature addresses, although they do not share its secular sensibilities, 
and hence they have every right to react to it in accord with the kinds of recognition it 
induces among them. It will not do to provide a celebratory account of Barsa’s questioning a 
patriarchal Islam and thereby asserting Muslim women’s self-worth. The elisions and 
erasures that are rhetorically secured in this account also need to be put to critical scrutiny. 
Reading Barsa against the grain by paying attention to the elisions and erasures enacted in 
the text affords us a better understanding of the issues that the novel is entangled in than a 
triumphalist account would allow.29 
 
The Female Muslim Subject in Leila Aboulela’s Fiction: A Contrast 
Finally, by way of comparison and contrast, I call attention to the anglophone Sudanese 
writer Leila Aboulela’s two novels The Translator and Minaret which, even as they exploit 
as one of their key thematic concerns the role of religion in the protagonists’ identity 
formation and personal development, do not, however, contra Barsa, commit the mistake of 
reducing the agency of the female Muslim subject to acts of destabilising or dismantling 
relations of domination.  
Set in Aberdeen, The Translator30 depicts the fraught and difficult romance between a 
recently widowed, devout, and veiled Sudanese woman, Sammar, and a Scottish professor of 
Middle East studies, Rae Isles. The main obstacle to their union is that he is an infidel and so 
cannot marry a Muslim woman. Sammar is the novel’s eponymous translator. She works as 
an Arabic to English translator for Rae, and the novel suggests that in so doing, she translates 
Islam into a properly felt system of beliefs for him. Though the romance has really 
blossomed, the obstacle to their marriage remains and Sammar decides to go back to 
Khartoum to live with her son. All is well when Rae converts to Islam and the two are joined 
in marriage.  
In Minaret,31 cast adrift by a chain of catastrophes such as her father’s execution after 
a coup, her mother’s fatal encounter with cancer, her brother’s imprisonment in England in a 
drug-related attempted murder, Najwa, the Westernised daughter of a corrupt political official 
in Sudan, accepts her desire for spiritual peace and turns to Islam. Islam becomes the only 
relief to the sudden difficulties and great solitude in which she finds herself. Through her 
growing faith she discovers a new peace and a new community. The prayer meetings with 
other women, the hijab, which covers her head, and the mellifluous call to prayer from the 
nearby mosque all give her an unexpected power to deal with her everyday problems.  
                                                
29 While examining the politics of the historical novel Azazeel by the Egyptian author Youssef Zeidan, 
Saba Mahmood calls attention to the ways in which literary works mobilise and engage various 
repertoires in order to elicit certain reading practices that assume the ways of understanding the world 
in one particular fashion rather than the other. See Saba Mahmood, ‘Azazeel and the Politics of 
Historical Fiction in Egypt,’ Comparative Literature, Vol. 65, No. 3 (2013) 265-284.  
30 Leila Aboulela, The Translator (New York: Black Cat, 1999).  
31 Leila Aboulela, Minaret (New York: Black Cat, 2005).  
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 The role of religion in fashioning the subjectivity of the protagonists in both the 
novels warrants a detailed analysis, but for our purposes here, I will only touch on it. Minaret 
presents an elaborate account of the hijab as clothing that is organic to a woman’s entire 
ethical disposition. Najwa’s recurrent reminiscences of her servants praying, girls wearing the 
hijab and students praying on the university campus in Khartoum, and the inexplicable envy 
and emptiness constitute stages in the eventual decision to wear the hijab – embracing the 
disposition that permeates all aspects of her life. The passages that follow attests to the fact 
that the hijab, to her, must mean more than a garment that covers her: 
 
I stood in front of the mirror and put the scarf over my hair. My curls resisted; the 
material quashed them down. They escaped, springing around my forehead, above my 
ears … I didn’t look like myself. Something was removed, streamlined; something 
was deflated. And was this the real me? ... untie the material; observe the 
transformation. Which made me look younger? Scarf or no scarf? Which made me 
look more attractive? The answer was clear to that one. I threw it on the bed. I was 
not ready yet; I was not ready for this step.32 
 
Although Najwa still debates whether she looks younger or more attractive with or without 
the headscarf, her introspection also gestures to the nagging feeling that she has always 
lacked something. It now becomes clear that this emptiness originates from the lack of will 
and opportunity to embrace Islam in a manner consonant with the disposition she must 
cumulatively cultivate by familiarising herself with an Islamic lifestyle. Finally, when she 
does decide to wear the hijab, she feels a ‘new gentleness’ and ‘softness’ around her.33 That 
the hijab constitutes the final and not the first step in Najwa’s religious discovery is testimony 
to its importance as more than a piece of clothing. It is clothing heavily infused with the 
modesty and sobriety that are gradually acquired and embodied through the aforementioned 
acts of piety and religious devotion. This is in stark contrast to Sabitha’s rantings about the 
hijab in Barsa that we considered earlier. Thus, the evaluative frameworks at stake in 
understanding the practice of veiling in Mumthas and Aboulela are markedly divergent, and 
it is these frameworks that make all the difference to their contrastive portrayals of the veiled 
female Muslim subject.  
Sammar in The Translator, like her counterpart in Minaret, chooses to wear the hijab 
and attend lessons at the mosque, much like the Egyptian women among whom Mahmood 
conducted her fieldwork in some mosques of Cairo, which eventually gave birth to Politics of 
Piety. Interestingly, Sammar even describes women as having ‘softer hearts’,34 a phrase that 
conjures up for me the image of what Mahmood might call ‘docile’ agents.35 In doing this, 
perhaps as an immigrant Muslim woman writer in the UK, Aboulela, much like her 
characters Najwa and Sammar, seeks to get visibility in a Europe where Muslim women, 
especially those who wear the hijab, are ‘visibly invisible’ to most eyes.  
Much as her characters are assertive, Aboulela, unlike Mumthas, does not, however, 
take as the raison d’être of her characters the project of questioning a patriarchal Islam. 
                                                
32 Aboulela, Minaret 245.  
33 Aboulela, Minaret 247.  
34 Aboulela, The Translator 124.  
35 Mahmood, Politics of Piety 29.  
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Aboulela’s characters accept the idea of polygamy. Sammar, after the death of her husband 
would like to become the second wife of an old man rather than remain alone. It is her 
aunt/mother-in-law that prohibits this. Polygamy is also a possibility in Minaret. Najwa 
contemplates it when Tamer asks her to marry him, ‘“Well, to say yes, you must promise me 
you’ll take a second wife.” “What a stupid thing to say, Najwa!” “Because I might not be 
able to have children ... I wouldn’t want you divorce me. I would rather be in the background 
of your life, always part of it, always hearing your news.”’36  
Sammar and Najwa, therefore, draw our attention to the necessity of discussing 
categories of identity, women’s agency, bodily form, political imaginary for a better 
understanding of how women can and do empower themselves through Islam in 
contemporary Europe and elsewhere. They invite us to challenge the normative feminist 
assumptions about women’s agency that give rise to typical progressivist narratives like 
Mumthas’ Barsa – narratives that are, to borrow Mahmood’s words, ‘encumbered by the 
binary terms of resistance and subordination, and ignore(s) projects, discourses, and desires 
that are not captured by these terms.’37 
 
Conclusion: The Epistemological Trap and the Labor of Critique38 
In conclusion, it seems to me that discoursing about the Muslim women’s veiling – even if 
she does wear the veil because she believes it is her way of deferring to God – borders on the 
Islamophobic. As Joan Scott convincingly argues, one of the ways in which the issue of Islam 
and the West has been put to political use in recent times is to paper over in the West all of 
the problems of gender inequality that are now being attributed to Islam.39 This then allows 
the Westerners to project their freedom and equal status by telling a story whose theme runs 
like this: since headscarf/veil is the sign of inequality, the Muslim women who take the veil 
are unequal in contrast to the Western women who do not veil and by virtue of it live in an 
egalitarian society. This rhetoric on the veil as the epitomic symptom of oppression then 
becomes a convenient way to overlook all of the (gender) inequalities that persist in Western 
societies. In reducing women’s freedom to their freedom from certain clothes/norms, I have 
                                                
36 Aboulela, Minaret 254-55.  
37 Mahmood, Politics of Piety 15.  
38 The term ‘epistemological trap’ refers to a situation in which the outcome of enquiry is 
predetermined by the very problematics and interpretive grids that inform it. Cf. Sheldon Pollock, 
‘India in the Vernacular Millennium: Literary Culture and Polity, 1000-1500,’ Daedalus, Vol. 127, 
No. 3 (1998) 43. Our analytical language is so deeply shaped by what Dipesh Chakrabarty calls the 
‘disenchanted prose’ of a higher, (read also, reasoned, secular, universal), scientific language that it is 
not possible for us to make politically meaningful statements without employing this normative 
language — a language that is constitutive of the modern world we inhabit — despite the fact that 
there are so many ‘enchanted’ life worlds and worldviews on this planet that do not neatly translate 
into this language without running the danger of distortion and misrepresentation. Given the problems 
of ‘translating diverse and enchanted worlds into the universal and disenchanted language’ of the 
social sciences, it is advisable, as Chakrabarty suggests, to conduct such translations by ‘hold(ing) 
one’s categories open’ so that one can take the master code, say History, to ‘its limits in order to make 
its unworking visible.’ Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Time of History and the Times of Gods’ in The 
Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital, eds. Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1997) 40, 51, 52, 58.  
39 Joan Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
 
The Many Riches of Human Flourishing: On the Veiled Agent in Veil Narratives. Muneer Aram 
Kuzhiyan. 
Transnational Literature Vol. 6 no. 2, May 2014. 
http://fhrc.flinders.edu.au/transnational/home.html 
 
 
12 
argued that narratives like Barsa miss the wood for the trees. This is where I have found 
Aboulela’s stories refreshingly corrective: much as her characters struggle to find their feet in 
an alien world that every immigrant is caught in, they present their religious tradition to be 
enabling rather than restrictive and recognise modalities of agency beyond the confines of 
subordination and resistance.  
Also, my intention in the essay has not been to impugn the modality of agency tied to 
resistance to relations of domination but to alert us to the fact that this normative conception 
of agency often works to blind us to other forms and manifestations of agency that animate 
different ways of being and acting in the world. In privileging certain normative assumptions 
about critique, Barsa also upholds the forms of exclusions, erasures, and hierarchies those 
assumptions create and seek to perpetuate. Similarly, narratives such as Barsa proceeds a 
priori from an always already problem of Islam without ever feeling the need to give second 
thoughts to the constructedness of this perennial problem and start asking reflective questions 
about the certitude of liberal, secular ethos. Thus, at a broader level, my critique of Barsa is 
intended as an invitation to defamiliarise one’s own confident, normative assumptions about 
what it means to be a human in this world in order to learn not only about but also from other 
umpteen riches of human flourishing on earth. Finally, although the sociality of Muslim 
women in Kerala, including the diverse conceptions of agency underlying their life worlds, 
needs to be explored in ethnographic detail, my concern in this essay has mainly been to 
comparatively probe the ideological fabrics of visions surrounding the female Muslim subject 
across what I have called ‘veil narratives’ in order to bring to light the workings of 
ideological suppositions that give shape and force to the narrative architecture of fictional 
prose.  
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